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Abstract A novel protocol is proposed to address the problem of user
authentication to smartcards using biometric authentication instead of
the usual PIN. The protocol emulates expensive Match On Card (MOC)
smartcards, which can compute a biometric match onboard, by using
cheap Template on Card (TOC) smartcards, which only store a biometric
template. The biometric match is performed by a module running on
the user’s workstation, authenticated by a mobile agent coming from a
reliable server. The protocol uses today’s cryptographic tokens without
requiring any HW/SW modification.
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1 Introduction
Smartcards are currently used as a secure and tamper-proof device to store sen-
sitive information such as digital certificates and private keys. Access to smart-
cards has historically been regulated by a trivial means of authentication: the
Personal Identification Number (PIN). A user gains access to a card if he/she
enters the right PIN. Experience shows that PINs are weak secrets [4] in the
sense that they are often poorly chosen, and that they are easy to lose.
Biometric technologies have been proposed to strengthen authentication mech-
anisms in general by matching a stored biometric template to a live biometric
template [1, 2]. In the case of authentication to smartcards, intuition imposes
the match to be performed by the smartcard chip. However, this is not always
possible because of the complexity of biometric information such as fingerprints
or iris scans, and because of the yet limited computational resources offered by
currently available smartcards.
In general, three strategies of biometric authentication can be identified.
Template on Card (TOC). The biometric template is stored on a hardware
security module (smartcard or USB token). It must be retrieved and trans-
mitted to a different system that matches it to the live template acquired
by special scanners from the user. Cheap memory-cards with no or small
operating systems are generally sufficient for this purpose.
Match on Card (MOC). The biometric template is stored on a hardware se-
curity module, which also performs the matching with the live template.
Therefore, a microprocessor smartcard is necessary, which must be endowed
with an operating system running a suitable match application.
System on Card (SOC). This is a combination of the previous two technolo-
gies. The biometric template is stored on a hardware security module, which
also performs the matching with the live template, and hosts the biometric
scanner to acquire, select, and process the live template.
Clearly, the third of the strategies sketched above is the best in terms of security
as everything takes place on card. Embedding a biometric reader on a smartcard
provides all the privacy and security answers but, unfortunately, it is expensive
and present more than a realization problem.
The benefits deriving from MOC cards are valuable themselves: using its
own processing capabilities the smartcard decides if the live template matches
the stored template closely enough, granting the access to its private data. Nev-
ertheless this scheme presents a danger: we have no certainty that a biometric
reading has been collected through live-scan and there is the risk of an attacker’s
sniffing the biometric and later using it to unlock the card in a replay attack.
In the present setting, how can we implement biometric authentication on
smartcards that are commercially available?
We address this issue by developing a novel protocol that employs inexpensive
TOC cards as if they were MOC cards and that takes care of the MOC technol-
ogy’s drawbacks; the requirements of the present work are to employ common
crypto smartcard without modifying the code inside them and without asking
the PIN directly to the user.
This paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 illustrates the security
problems using TOC for authenticating a user to a smartcard. Section 3 sketches
the adopted solution. The protocol is introduced in Section 4, while implementa-
tion details are described in Section 5. Section 6 illustrates the solved/unsolved
security problems. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and proposes possible
future works.
2 Security problems using TOC technology
Before describing the protocol, let’s explain some problems related to the use
of TOC technology for authenticating a user to a smartcard (SC). There are
several points of attack in the use of TOC technology without securing the data
transmission among the biometric device, the smartcard reader and the local
host that executes the biometric match. Consequently, we have to consider some
aspects before designing our secure protocol.
The idea of using TOC technology to authenticate a user to a SC (without
security concerns) is:
1. A cryptographic application asks to authenticate the user to the SC through
a specific API call.
2. The biometric template is read from the SC.
3. A real time template is acquired from the user by means of a biometric
scanner.
4. A biometric match between the two templates is performed on the local host.
5. If the biometric match is successful then the actual PIN is submitted to the
card to unlock the crypto chip.
A schematic representation of the protocol is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure1. A TOC Protocol
The major problems of the above protocol are:
– The enrollment template stored inside the smartcard could be eavesdropped
at step 2.
– The real time template could be eavesdropped at step 3.
– The smartcard doesn’t trust the module performing the match at step 4.
– Where to store the secret login data (PIN) used to actually log the user into
the cryptographic chip (we don’t want to ask it to the user).
The first two points are critical if it is possible by an attacker to use the smartcard
(after he/she has stolen it) for a replay attack sending again the eavesdropped
data directly to the verification module. In this case, there is no security mecha-
nism to verify that the biometric verification data are derived from an actual live
presentation to the biometric sensor. To solve these problems we could encrypt
the data exchanged between the devices and the crypto library or find a way to
trust the module that acquire the live template.
SC is unable to authenticate the verification module. Maybe using a kind of
challenge-response protocol: the module requests a random to the SC and this is
returned encrypted with a shared secret key. Now the dilemma is where to store
the key on the host.
The only method to unlock the private area of the chip is to supply the exact
PIN to the SC. If the PIN is correct then the SC trusts the module that has
performed the local biometric match.
Therefore, the crucial point is the last one: where to store the secret PIN1.
An obvious way is to store the PIN inside the compiled Crypto Module. This
is not a good solution because a malicious user might do reverse engineering on
the library and find the secret. Whatever place inside the user’s file system is
not sure if a malicious program has manipulated the host, so the safest place is
inside a protected remote Server.
3 The adopted solution
Now the problem to solve is how the remote Server can send a critical data to
an unknown remote host. This is like a black box and the server does not know
if a malicious entity is running on that client.
A mutual authentication establishing a SSL connection between the client
and the server is a good solution, but like the PIN, there is always the recursive
problem of where to store the certificate/private key of the client (we don’t want
to use another smartcard [12] and we would not to ask another PIN to the user
for unblocking this private key).
We chose to adopt another solution: using a Mobile Agent framework. If the
server cannot trust applications running on the client, it will trust code that it
launches to the client: a mobile agent.
A remote agent, launched from the secure server, try to authenticate the
module that executes the biometric match on the client; if the result of the
authentication is positive then the server sends the secret PIN to the client
through a previously opened secure connection.
The chosen framework was SeMoA [7] (Secure Mobile Agents). It is a run-
time environment for Java-based mobile agents in development at the Fraunhofer
Institute for Computer Graphics, with a main focus on security.
3.1 SeMoA framework
A Mobile Agent is a software entity that is not bound to the host where it
begins execution, but has the unique ability to travel across a network and
perform tasks on machines that provide agent-hosting capability. Unlike remote
procedure calls, where a process invokes procedures of a remote host, process
migration allows executable code to travel autonomously and to interact with the
hosting machine’s resources, including other mobile agents. Therefore, a Mobile
Agent framework has to cope with various security threats [9]: malicious agents
might try to break into the server in order to harm other agents or to gain
1 In a previous work [3], has been investigated a similar problem developing a compa-
rable protocol. In that case, the PIN was asked directly to the user and there was
the need to install a piece of code into the smartcard to carry out the protocol.
unauthorized system access. A malicious host could tamper with agents. Agents
might be sniffed while they are transferred over the network.
Many open source agent development framework are available on the internet:
we decided to adopt SeMoA because it puts emphasis on security and try to solve
the problems mentioned above.
SeMoA, developed in Java, supports many security mechanisms for Mobile
Agent Systems, providing protection both to the host and to the Mobile Agents.
The security architecture of the SeMoA server is organized like an “onion”: the
agents have to pass through all the several protection layers before they are
admitted to the execution environment. For example, the first is a layer of secu-
rity transport such as SSL; the second, instead, consists of a pipeline of security
filters. Several pipelines for incoming and outgoing agents are supported and a
filter at the end of the incoming pipeline assigns a configurable set of permissions
to incoming agents; these permissions are based on information established and
verified by previous filters. Dynamically generated authorizations are assigned
to the classes that constitute the mobile agents.
4 Protocol Description
This section presents the protocol. It illustrates the interactions among the main
entities (details will be introduced in section 5).
Description of the entities:
– Client: the user’s workstation
• Application: the user application that requires the access to the smart-
card through the Crypto Module (for instance a digital signature appli-
cation).
• Crypto/Verification Module: the main entity used to access to the smart-
card and to perform the local biometric match (it implements the client-
side protocol).
• SeMoA Framework: the runtime environment for the Mobile Agent com-
ing from the Server.
– Server: the secure host where is contained the secret login data
• SeMoA Framework: the runtime environment for the Service implement-
ing the protocol.
• MOC Service: the Service which accepts connections and implements the
protocol.
• MOC Agent: the Mobile Agent that is launched from Moc Service, gets
to the Client and comes back with the result of the authentication.
A schematic representation can be defined as in Figure 2.
1. User application requires the access to the private space of the smartcard
through a particular Crypto API call.
2. The Crypto Module (CM) opens a connection to the Moc Service (MocS)
running on the Server.
Figure2. the Protocol
3. After the connection has been established, CM generates a large Random
value and stores it inside itself (value used by the mobile agent at step 7).
4. Finally, CM sends the Random and the smartcard Serial Number to MocS:
if there will be a happy end for the protocol CM will receive the secret login
data, otherwise MocS will close the connection.
5. In the meantime, the Verification Module executes a biometric match be-
tween the template stored into the smartcard and the live acquired one.
6. MocS stores the Random previously received within a MOC Mobile Agent
and launches it to the Client address; after this, MocS begins to wait the
return of the Agent.
7. Now the MOC Agent is migrated on the client:
– It tests the validity of the modules residing on the user’s workstation
checking their digital signature.
– It checks that the random inside itself has the same value of the random
contained in CM .
– It ensures that the biometric match executed at step five is successful.
If all the previous controls are positive then we can trust the CM module
that has started the protocol.
8. The Agent comes back to the Server and returns the result to MocS.
9. If the result is positive then MocS sends, on the same connection opened
at step two, the secret login data (PIN)2 correlated to the Serial Number
received at step four. Otherwise, it closes the connection with the client.
10. In the last step, CM unlocks the private area using the received PIN and
confirms to the user application the success of the Crypto API call made at
step one.
2 The PIN might be delivered directly by the Agent at the end of step 7 (only if all the
checks are positive). We have avoided this solution because even if it is the fastest,
it is the less safe too: the agent might be tampered with by a malicious entity, for
extracting the PIN.
5 Implementation
The protocol and all the entities has been developed and deployed on a Windows
2000 Professional workstation, so some details are particular to this architecture.
With respect to the hardware, the biometric scanner employed is an FX2000
produced by Biometrika srl [13], while the smartcard used is a Cyberflex e-gate
produced by Schlumberger [14]. (As we will see later, it’s possible to employ any
kind of biometric device or smartcard without modifying the protocol by only
changing the respective library.)
The principal technology employed, besides SeMoA, is the PKCS#11 stan-
dard [8], which has been used as the Crypto module. We have chosen this solu-
tion because this is the most diffused de-facto standard in today’s cryptographic
tokens.
5.1 PKCS#11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard
The PKCS#11 standard specifies an API, called “Cryptoki” (cryptographic to-
ken interface), to interface the devices that hold cryptographic information and
that perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki follows a simple object based
approach, addressing the goals of technology independence (any kind of device)
and resource sharing (multiple applications accessing multiple devices), present-
ing to applications a common, logical view of the device called a “cryptographic
token”. The Cryptoki is important because it isolates an application from the
details of the cryptographic device. The application does not have to change to
interface to a different type of device or to run in a different environment; thus,
the application is portable.
5.2 BioAPI
The standard employed to perform all the required biometric operations is
BioAPI [5]. This API is intended to provide a high-level generic biometric
authentication model; one suited for any form of biometric technology. It covers
the basic functions of Enrollment, Verification, and Identification, and includes
a database interface to allow a Biometric Service Provider (BSP) to manage the
Identification population for optimum performance. It also provides primitives
that allow the application to manage the capture of samples on a client, and the
Enrollment, Verification, and Identification on a server.
5.3 Java Native Interface
Another technology we have used to implement this protocol has been the Java
Native Interface (JNI) [10]. This was used to exchange data between the MOC
Mobile Agent (which runs in a Java virtual machine) and the dlls (which are
native libraries) at step 7 of the protocol. The JNI is a powerful feature that
allows you to take advantage of the Java platform, but still utilize code written
in other languages. As a part of the Java virtual machine implementation, the
JNI is a two-way interface that allows Java applications to invoke native code
and vice versa.
Figure 3 describes the protocol more in details. The previous client’s Crypto-
Verification module has been distinguished in four different dynamic link libraries
(dll):
1. PKCS#11 module: this is the library provided by the smartcard manufac-
turer. This dll permits the user authentication to the smartcard using the
normal PIN. Therefore it is possible to switch from a smartcard brand to
another by only changing this module.
2. Crypto Wrapper: this is a dll wrapper to the PKCS#11 module; all the API
calls are proxied to the manufacturer’s dll except for the C Login function:
this is the point where the client-side protocol is implemented.
3. Verification module: it performs the local biometric match through the BioAPI
library. Also in this case it is possible to use another Biometric device by
only changing the Biometric Service Provider (BSP) dll.
4. JNI stub: this module is used by the Java Mobile Agent to access to the
Crypto Wrapper and to the Verification module. It works with JNI.
Inside the server is present a certification authority (CA) which is used to issue
certificates for the users. CA issues also Attribute Certificates containing the
enrolled biometric template [1]; they are stored into the smartcards along with
the x509 user’s certificates.
Every client’s dll that performs the protocol is digitally signed [6] by the
Server’s private key, so that the components can mutual authenticates themselves
and the Mobile Agent can check their validity.
5.4 Detailed Protocol
1. User application requires the access to the smartcard through a C Login call.
(The application needs, for instance, to use the user’s private key stored in
the smartcard). The call corresponds to a C Login(NULL), where NULL
means that biometric authentication is requested (no PIN is given as pa-
rameter).
2. The Crypto Wrapper (CW ) opens a SSL connection to the Moc Service
(MocS) running on the Server. Naturally, an encrypted connection is used
to avoid sniffing the data when the secret login PIN is sent over the channel.
We use SSL server authentication to check the server’s identity. (NO SSL
client authentication, because there would be the recursive problem of where
storing the client’s private key.)
3. After the connection has been established, CW generates a large random
value and stores it inside a Shared Data Section [11]: all the processes that
will use this module, will access to the same variable. In this way, we can
detect possible malicious modules that try to start the protocol. (The only
Figure3. the detailed Protocol
module that is permitted to start the protocol is CW ). The random will be
checked by the mobile agent at step 7.
4. Finally, CW sends the Random and the smartcard Serial Number3 toMocS:
if there will be a happy end for the protocol CW will receive the secret login
data, otherwise MocS will close the SSL connection.
5. In the meantime, the Verification Module (VM) executes a biometric match
between the template stored into the smartcard and the live acquired one.
VM reads the Attribute Certificate stored inside the smartcard, verifies its
validity and extracts the biometric template. Then, VM acquires the live
template from the scanner through the BioAPI module only if the BSP’s
digital signature is correctly verified.
6. MocS generates a MOC Mobile Agent, sign it, and launches it to the Client
address (inside the Agent has been stored the Random previously received);
after this, MocS begins to wait the return of the Agent. Also in this case,
the agent is sent over an encrypted channel.
7. Now the MOC Agent is migrated on the client. The SeMoA environment
checks the digital signature of the Agent to see if it comes from the trusted
Server; if so, then:
– It tests the validity of the dlls, residing on the user’s workstation at a
precise path, checking their digital signature.
– Through Java Native Interface (JNI), it checks that the random inside
itself has the same value of the random contained in CW . The Agent
3 Inside the Server is installed a DataBase which contains for every serial number the
respective unique PIN. The serial is used at step 9.
reads the random value thanks to a function created on purpose into
CW .
– Through JNI, it ensures that the biometric match executed at step five
is successful.
The check of the random value has been employed to verify that the correct
CW has started the protocol. If the random is different, it means that a
malicious entity is trying to deceive the Server for stealing the secrets PINs.
The digital signature of the modules is checked to ensure that only trusted
dlls are carrying out the protocol. Finally, the last check verifies that the
proper user is accessing the smartcard. Only if all the above checks are
positive then we trust the CW module that has started the SSL connection.
8. The Agent comes back to the Server and returns the result to MocS.
9. If the result is positive thenMocS sends, on the same SSL connection opened
at step two, the secret login data (PIN) correlated to the Serial Number
received at step four. Otherwise, it closes the connection with the client.
10. In the last step, CW unlocks the private area using the received PIN (it
performs a C Login(PIN) calling the PKCS#11 module) and confirms to
the user application the success of the C Login call made at step one.
6 Solved security problems
If the attacker has not stolen the user’s smartcard, he could try to get possession
of the PINs residing into the safe Server:
– If no smartcard is inserted, the protocol will not start.
– If a wrong or malicious dll dealing with the communication with the SC is
installed, the Mobile Agent will notice it.
– If a different module from CW tries to connect to MocS, the Mobile Agent
will notice it through the random comparison.
– If he is using a brand new smartcard, with a proper serial number, the server
will not return the PIN: the malicious user is not able to pass the local
biometric match. (Inside the smartcard there is not an Attribute Certificate
containing the fingerprint template issued by the Server’s CA).
If the attacker has stolen the user’s smartcard and the right dlls are installed:
– he could try to change the template stored into the SC: he cannot, because
the biometric template is contained in an Attribute Certificate signed by the
Server CA.
– Even if a biometric template has been previously sniffed, it is not possible to
inject it within the Verification Module: before that VM acquire a template
from the biometric device, it verifies that the Biometric Service Provider
dll is the trusted one through digital signature. (no more biometric replay
attacks)
6.1 The two feasible attacks
The possible attacks to the implemented protocol concern how the PIN is trans-
mitted in the final step, and the malicious host threats [9] in a mobile agent
framework.
In the first case, the PIN could be sniffed if the channel between the SC
reader and the host is not protected. If the attacker has stolen the user’s SC, he
could bypass all the protocol and use only the manufacturer PKCS#11 library.
We assume that this is not possible because we rely on the smartcard producer’s
Crypto Module. (A possible solution is to implement some kind of challenge-
response protocol adding a piece of code inside the smartcard [3]).
The other way to attack this protocol is modifying the SeMoA framework
and/or the Java Virtual Machine on the client’s workstation. This is a common
problem in the Mobile Agent Systems field [9]. In our case, an attacker succeeds if
he is able to alter the Mobile Agent’s return value with a positive result even if the
checks on the client are negative. This problem could be solved by employing a
mutual authentication protocol between the client/server SeMoA environments,
by using a secure trusted hardware (at least on the client): it would be used to
store the framework private key and to check the validity of the agent runtime
environment.
7 Conclusions
Modern, inexpensive TOC smartcards cannot compute a biometric match as
MOC smartcards. We developed a protocol, which simulates the MOC strategy
through the use of TOC cards. In practice, the actual match is delegated to a
module of the card host after an authentication performed by a mobile agent
coming from a secure server.
The design we have presented has been fully implemented using the SeMoA
framework, which provides an open source mobile agent system, and through two
de-facto standards as PKCS#11 and BioAPI, respectively used to communicate
with the crypto smartcard and to interact with the biometric functions. The
use of these standard lead to an implementation where any smartcard and any
biometric device can be used.
Potential future works will concern addressing the issues described in Sec-
tion 6.1 (local PIN sniffing and malicious host attack), and trying to adapt the
protocol in other areas where the entity performing the biometric match is not
trusted.
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